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Considering the increasingly international banks of today, the health of a country’s bank-
ing sector is crucial not only to the country’s growth and prosperity but also to the rest of
the international ﬁnancial community. Early warning signals of a banking sector in trouble
or a pending banking crisis would therefore be of great value to both banks, investors and
banking regulators/supervisors world wide. Diﬀerent warning signals exist and in this paper
we investigate how the stock market can provide a market-based indicator of banking sector
health. Hall and Miles (1990) suggests an approach of estimating default probabilities of
individual banks using only their stock market valuations and volatilities. In this paper we
apply an aggregated version of their approach to banking sectors around the world in both
developed and emerging economies and study the market’s assessment of the probability of
systemic banking crises in these countries over the last decade, including the Asian Crisis
1997-98. In addition, we investigate whether there is a relationship between the probability
of banking sector failure and institutional/structural features of the actual banking sector.
The quality of governance and the degree of law and order in a country is found to be signif-
icantly negatively related to the market based failure probabilities as is an explicit deposit
insurance during periods of crisis.
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21 Introduction
The health of the banking sector is of crucial importance to the functioning of a modern market
economy and banks and other ﬁnancial institutions are therefore closely monitored by govern-
ments, supervisors, and regulators. The government can inﬂuence the banking sector’s suscep-
tibility to problems (and potential crises) through the establishment of an eﬃcient legal and
institutional framework. It must implement adequate prudential supervision and regulation,
and must further ensure appropriate accounting and auditing practices.
Although structural measures taken by the government to prevent crises from appearing in
the banking sector are important, they are not always suﬃcient. If a crisis hits despite the
government’s attempts, standing ready and prepared to meet and minimize the negative eﬀects
of the crisis is equally important. This highlights the importance of ﬁnding ways to predict and
identify an upcoming crisis as early as possible. What is needed are indicators or signals that
early on can tell investors, ﬁnancial institutions and regulators world wide where and when the
probability of a crisis is high and where it is low. The structural and institutional features of
a banking sector can usually be of some help but while such features might indicate where (in
which country) a banking crisis eventually might hit, they are not always very good indicators
of when the crisis will strike.
Information regarding the health of the banking system is usually available and the question
is merely how to distill the information and create a reliable indicator that can be used as an
early warning signal. Microeconomic indicators, like items from banks’ balance sheets, that
directly relate to the health of individual banks can be aggregated across the whole banking
sector and can be useful as an indicator of the sector’s health. If such bank-speciﬁc indicators
are not available, or if they are not reliable, an alternative is to turn to macroeconomic indicators
and market prices. Macroindicators like growth, consumption, investments, inﬂation and capital
ﬂows and priceindicators such as exchange rates, interest rates and stock prices can all be useful
as indicators of a pending banking sector crisis.
The aggregated views of economic agents regarding risks and returns are eﬃciently reﬂected
by the ﬁnancial markets, and the discipline that the markets impose on ﬁnancial entities can
play a role in ensuring ﬁnancial stability. An example of the increased emphasis by regulators on
market forces as a tool to promote safety and soundness in the ﬁnancial system is the approach
to capital adequacy and banking supervision recently developed by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision. Their new framework on banking supervision (The New Basel Capital
Accord) rests on three pillars, and by including market discipline as one of the pillars, the
committee recognizes the importance of the market as both an indicator and promotor of safety
and soundness in diﬀerent sectors of the economy.
3In this paper we follow the market-based path and assume that investors’ views on the health
and prospects of the banking sector can be distilled from stock prices and that stock market
information can help predict banking crises. In an eﬃcient stock market, all relevant information
that is related to the actual bank, macro- as well as micro-information, should be captured in
the bank’s market value and additional analysis of the bank, for instance by taking a closer look
at the bank’s balance sheet, or talking to its senior management, would be futile. If we expect
markets to be eﬃcient, then the variability in the bank’s market value is an important piece of
information that should be included in any indicator of the bank’s performance and health.
Some attempts of using stock prices as indicators of banks’ ﬁnancial strength and credit-
worthiness can be found in the literature. One such study is Shick and Sherman (1980) that
investigates bank stock prices and their ability to function as early warning signals. Shick and
Sherman (1980) ﬁnds that changes in the regulator rating of a certain bank are reﬂected in the
behavior of the bank’s stock price and that the stock price corrections lead the actual rating
change by at least 15 months. An other study that examines the ability of stock prices, stock
return volatilities as well as other market variables to predict rating changes is Curry, Elmer and
Fissel (2001). Investigating a large number of banks that have faced changes in their regulator
rating they ﬁnd that stock prices keep falling and stock return volatilities keep rising for at
least a year before an actual downgrade. The major drawback of these studies in the context
of banks and their failure rates is their purely statistical nature and that they do not rest on
theoretical grounds; there is no model underneath that motivates the choice of the particular
market variables as default measures. In addition, there is no natural way of transforming these
signals to actual default probabilities.
In order to avoid these problems, we have chosen to adopt an approach suggested by Hall
and Miles (1990) that in a simple way gives us estimates of default probabilities. The approach
relies solely on market data and can therefore be used on any bank (or group of banks) with
traded stocks. It is also easily reproduced by anyone who has access to the history of stock
prices of the bank(s) in question. The Hall and Miles (1990) approach is not without its own
drawbacks and a major assumption is that of eﬃcient markets. By relying on markets to be
eﬃcient, as well as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965),
and a modelling of returns as Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic in Mean
(GARCH-M) processes, the Hall and Miles (1990) approach gives us a measure of the distance
to default of a particular bank or banking sector at its current value and volatility. This distance
to default measure can then easily be transformed to a default probability1.
1In this paper we use the words default and failure as synonyms indicating a situation in which a bank, or the
entire banking sector, might become unable to meet its contractual liabilities out of its own resources due to its
4Hall and Miles (1990) applies their technique to four individual British banks over the period
1975 to 1987 and Clare and Priestly (2002) applies the same approach to Norwegian banks in
the late 1980s when the Norwegian banking sector went through a serious banking crisis. Clare
and Priestley (2002) shows that the market based approach of Hall and Miles (1990) captures
much of this turmoil by indicating an increased probability of defaults in the banking sector
during the crisis years compared to before or after the crisis. In a similar study Byström (2002)
looks at the major Swedish banks during the Swedish banking crisis of the early 1990s. Byström
(2002) compares market-based failure probabilities to rating implied probabilities by Moody’s
and Fitch, and extends the Hall and Miles (1990) approach using extreme value theory. Byström
(2002) ﬁnds a close correspondence between actual credit health changes and the market-based
default probabilities. The market is further found to react much faster than the rating agencies
to the unfolding banking crisis.
While Hall and Miles (1990) applies their methodology to individual banks we apply an
aggregated version of the approach to banking sectors in 34 countries around the world. As
proxies for these banking sectors we use FTSE all-world banking sector stock indices. These
indices include banks but no other ﬁnancial ﬁrms and represent the aggregated valuation of
the banking sector in a particular country. Compared to Hall and Miles (1990) and Clare and
Priestley (2002) we present our results in a more informative way by transforming our estimated
default measures to actual probabilities of default. These probabilities should probably not
be interpreted literally but nonetheless they give an overall, albeit rather crude, indication of
the health of the particular banking sector. In addition, the relative default risks in diﬀerent
countries, and the changes in the levels over time can provide useful information about how the
market assesses the health of banking systems world wide. Considering the fact that most banks
of today have signiﬁcant parts of their credit exposures (to banks) abroad, this information can
be used both by the banks themselves and by national bank supervisors in estimating the risks
to their domestic ﬁnancial system.
The time period we are looking at is 1994 to 2002, a time period containing the Asian
crisis 1997-98. According to the market, failure probabilities in most banking sectors increased
signiﬁcantly during the crisis years, not only in the Asian countries directly involved in the
turmoil. Considering most banks’ considerable overseas exposures as well as the close links
b e t w e e nb a n k i n gs y s t e m si nd i ﬀerent countries this is not very surprising. The dot-com and
technology boom in 1999 and 2000 and its bust in 2001 and 2002 are also covered by the data
negative net market-value. A failure is not always followed by a formal declaration of insolvency (and subsequent
closure) by the chartering authority, but equity holders, and some debt holders, usually loose large parts of their
invested capital.
5but do not seem to be as critical to the credit health of the banking sectors as the Asian crisis.
We also investigate whether various structural features of a particular banking system are
related to the market’s view of the stability of the banking system and how likely it is to end
up in distress. Factors we look at are the existence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme
(whether the government will compensate depositors or not), regulatory environment (the way
ab a n ki sd e ﬁned and what business the bank is allowed to engage in), ownership (proportion
state-owned banks), the quality of government (law and order, lack of corruption), ﬁnancial
structure (if the ﬁnancial system is ”bank based” or ”market based”) and ﬁnally the eﬃciency
of the banking sector (interest rate margin, overhead costs). The data comes from numerous
studies at the World Bank and at the International Monetary Fund dealing with the stability
of ﬁnancial systems around the world (Barth, Caprio Jr. and Levine (1999); Barth, Caprio Jr.
and Levine (2000); Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999); Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache
(1999), Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999)). Using simple OLS regressions we ﬁnd the quality of
government (lack of corruption, law and order, small expropriation risk) as well as low degrees
of state ownership in the banking sector to be negatively related to failure probabilities before
the Asian crisis while during the Asian crisis an explicit deposit insurance scheme (as well as
good governance) seems to reduce the conceived risk to the banking sector stability.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the Hall and Miles (1990) model and
how we can assess the probability of bank failure using market prices. Section 3 describes the
data and section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5, ﬁnally, concludes the paper.
2 Assessing the Probability of Bank Failure Using Market Prices
In this section we will describe the Hall and Miles (1990) approach. The advantage of this
method is that it relies solely on stock market data. While Hall and Miles (1990) apply their
model to individual banks we instead apply it to the ”diversiﬁed portfolio” of banks that makes
up the banking sector in a particular country.
A typical bank2 has both assets and liabilities and if we assume that all these claims are








2We follow the derivation of Hall and Miles (1990) and use the word bank even though we apply the approach
to entire banking sectors (portfolios of banks).
6where N is the number of outstanding stocks, Pit is the price of the bank’s asset or liability i
at time t,a n dXit is the amount of the asset/liability at time t (positive if an asset, negative
if a liability). If we assume that (1) holds then the expected value of the stock in the future
together with the variability of the value around this expectation can tell us something about
the probability of the bank actually defaulting (the larger the number of standard deviations
the stock capital represents at time t the smaller the probability of default)
As one of the most popular models of stock price formation, the CAPM expresses the
expected return of a stock, E(Rt), at time t a st h er i s kf r e er e t u r n ,RFt,a tt i m et (for instance




= RFt + RPt. (2)
The expectations are formed at t−1 and the risk premium can be thought of as the amount of
risk that an investor has to be compensated for multiplied by the market price of this risk, λt.
According to the CAPM not all risk can be expected to be compensated for, and in equilibrium
only non-diversiﬁable risk is priced. This means that only the risk that cannot be ”diversiﬁed
away” should be compensated in the market by a higher return than the risk free return. If we
call the amount of expected non-diversiﬁable risk E(NDt) we can change (2) to
E(Rt)=RFt + λtE(NDt). (3)
Since the market participants cannot be expected to be right all the time, (3) is only true on
average. The actual return between t − 1 and t is instead given by the expected return in (3)
plus a stochastic error term, εt, that on average is equal to zero:
Rt = RFt + λtE(NDt)+εt. (4)
We can now express the expected value of bank capital, E(StN),a s
E(StN)=St−1N {1+RFt + λtE(NDt)}. (5)
and actual value of bank capital as depending on the random term εt
StN = St−1N {1+RFt + λtE(NDt)+εt}. (6)
Therefore, the actual value of bank capital at time t can be divided into a deterministic part
and a stochastic part,
StN = E(StN)+St−1Nεt, (7)





εt is the variance of εt at time t. This is the variability in the market value of the bank
(or its portfolio of assets and liabilities) around the market’s expected value, and this is the
variability measure that is of interest to the supervisor or regulator.
If the assumption of market eﬃciency holds, and if we divide the value of the bank, St−1N,








This metric shows the number of standard deviations that the value of the bank (or banking
sector) represents at time t − 1 and it can easily be transformed to a default probability if we
assume normality of the error term3. For instance, a value of 1
σεt equal to 2.33 would represent
a 1 in 100 probability of default and a value of 3.09 would represent a 1 in 1000 probability of
default between t − 1 and t.
In order to get an estimate of σεt, the standard deviation of εt, we return to (2) which




= RFt + βtE(RMt − RFt) (9)
where RMt is the return on the market portfolio and βt is the expected conditional CAPM
coeﬃcient deﬁned in its usual way as
E(σRt,RMt)
E(σ2
RMt) . From the CAPM we also know that the
risk premium on the market portfolio must be the market price of risk, λt, multiplied by the
expected variance, E(σ2
RMt), of the market portfolio returns (the expected non-diversiﬁable risk
of the market portfolio). Thus
E(RMt)=RFt + λtE(σ2
RMt) (10)






3We deﬁne default as the point in time when the value of the bank’s capital (assets minus liabilities) is equal
to zero. Of course, if some liabilities are not due at time t this measure should be modiﬁed to take this into
consideration. The eﬀect would be a reduction of the probability of default.
8Rewriting (4) but for the market portfolio instead of the individual bank leaves us with
RMt = RFt + λtE(σ2
RMt)+υt = RFt + λtE(σ2
υt)+υt (11)
where υt is a random error term that on average is equal to zero just like εt.I fw ea d dt h ee r r o r
term, εt, to (9) and substitute for the deﬁnition of βt w ea l s oe n du pw i t ha ne q u a t i o nf o rt h e
individual bank,





which, using the deﬁnition of the market price of risk ﬁnally can be written as
Rt = RFt + λtE(σRt,RMt)+εt = RFt + λtE(σεt,υt)+εt. (12)
The coupled equations (11) and (12) contain expectations of variances and covariances and
in order to model these (and to get an estimate of the distance to default measure 1
σεt )w eu s e
a bivariate GARCH-M framework. While Hall and Miles (1990) uses severely restricted non-
standard versions of ARCH and GARCH, and Clare and Priestley (2002) makes a seemingly
ad hoc choice of a non-standard AGARCH-M bivariate model we try to choose our model
in a more systematic way. First of all, when estimating a multivariate GARCH-M system
one easily ends up with tens (or hundreds) of parameters to estimate. In order to keep the
number of parameters down, and hopefully get more reasonable parameter estimates, one should
therefore favor parsimonious representations to more elaborated ones (particularly if one has
rather short data series). Hall and Miles (1990) solves this problem by putting several restrictions
on their equations and Clare and Priestley (2002) by choosing a non-standard covariance matrix
representation.
In the spirit of transparency and parsimony we neglect possible asymmetries or seasonalities
in the return series, and limit ourselves to a ﬁrst order GARCH(1,1) representation. We also
choose the parsimonious constant correlation representation for the covariance matrix. Finally,
we assume the market price of risk, λt,t ob ec o n s t a n t ,i . e . λt = λ, for all t.I n t h i s w a y w e
end up with a system (of excess returns) containing only 10 parameters to estimate using the
maximum likelihood method (BHHH):
Rt − RFt = αi,1 + λE(σεt,υt)+εt

















υt) are the expected conditional variances of εt and υt (as the market
perceives it), ρε,υ is the correlation coeﬃcient, E(σεt,υt) is the expected covariance between εt
and υt, and εt = σεtu1,a n dυt = συtu2 where ui ∼ N(0,1). From (13) we obtain estimates of
σεt, the conditional variance of the banking sector’s excess return, at each point in time that we
can plug into the metric for the probability of failure, 1
σεt.
The next issue to handle is the choice of time scale. Eq. (13) gives us a constantly updated
metric as to the probability of failure of a particular banking sector within the next day, week,
month or year depending on our choice of data. From a practical point of view, the most
reasonable frequency for updating the default rate is probably monthly; daily or weekly estimates
contain too much noise and are too frequent for our purpose, and quarterly or yearly estimates are
unnecessarily infrequent considering the quality of data available. In order to use the relatively
s h o r td a t as e r i e sa se ﬃcient as possible, however, we have chosen to estimate such a monthly
(default within a month) 1
σεt measure using daily data. To create a monthly default measure
from the daily σεt estimates we simply add up the 21 daily variances within the month (to get






Our next step is to calculate actual default probabilities associated with the default metric
above. As mentioned earlier, in order to do so we draw on the assumption of normally distributed
error terms and simply map the metric to a probability using the negative tail of the normal
distribution function. Further, since the procedure outlined above gives us monthly default
rates while common practice is to discuss yearly default rates, we choose to scale up the monthly
probabilities using the square-root rule; the yearly failure probability is calculated using a yearly
metric constructed from the monthly metric by dividing (scaling) the monthly metric by
√
125.
3T h e D a t a
The purpose of this paper is to apply the technique described above to banking sectors around
the world, focusing particularly on the Asian ﬁnancial crisis period 1997-98. As proxies for the
4The procedure is an approximation since it assumes independent error terms, εt.
5Again, this procedure is an approximation since it assumes independent monthly metrics.
10banking sectors we use FTSE All-World banking sector indices6 and as market indices we use
FTSE All-World country indices. As a proxy for the risk free interest rate we use the most liquid
3-month interest rate that is available in each country. All data is quoted daily (closing values)
and all prices are measured in local currencies.
The FTSE All-World data base contains countries where ﬁnancial markets and institutional
frameworks are eﬃcient enough for prices to reﬂect the actual values of the listed entities. The
indices are weighted by market capitalization and are supposed to capture 90% of the total
market capitalization in the corresponding sector or country (FTSE (2002)). The FTSE All-
World data base (accessed using Datastream) contains 49 countries in total but 15 of these
countries were removed from our sample because either the banking sector price series, the
market price series, or the interest rate series was too short for our purpose (or contained periods
of stale prices, zero prices or other price behavior not in accordance with market eﬃciency). The
34 remaining countries in our study are listed in Table 1. Most of the series cover the period
January 1994 to June 2002 but for nine countries the data was only available from January 1996.
In addition to these individual countries, we also look at the FTSE All-World global banking
index divided into developed and emerging countries, respectively7.
In addition to the stock market data used to calculate failure probabilities we also look
at a range of structural parameters describing the ﬁnancial institutional framework in each
country. Our purpose is to investigate whether these structural factors are related to the market’s
assessment of failure probabilities. The factors we have chosen to look at are: the general
ﬁnancial structure, the amount of regulative restrictions to bank activities, the degree of state
ownership in the banking sector, the quality of government, the eﬃciency of the banking sector,
and the existence or not of an explicit deposit insurance scheme.
The ﬁrst factor, ﬁnancial structure, is simply a classiﬁcation of a country as market-based or
bank-based. Ratios of stock market development relative to banking sector development (based
on measures of size, activity and eﬃciency ) are used to calculate an overall index of ﬁnancial
structure. The larger this index is the more market-based the country’s economy is. The index
is calculated by Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) using data collected from up to 150 countries
over the 1990s. As a measure of ﬁnancial structure based on size they use the ratio of domestic
stock market capitalization to domestic assets of deposit money banks, as a measure based on
activity they use the ratio of the total value of stock transactions on domestic exchanges to
6In the case of Finland and New Zeeland there were no banking sector indicies available and broader ﬁnancial
indicies were used instead.
7The market index in this case is the global FTSE All-World index covering all 49 countries and 2300 stocks.
The ”world interest rate” is simply the average of the 3-month rates across all countries.
11private credit by deposit money banks, and ﬁnally as a measure based on eﬃciency they use
the product of the value of all stock market transactions as a share of GDP and banks average
overhead costs. The ﬁnancial structure index we use in this paper is simply the average of
these ratios, after removing the means of each series, and the index is available for 32 of our 34
countries.
The second factor, regulatory restrictions, is represented by an index capturing how restrictive
a country’s bank regulation is. Barth, Caprio Jr. and Levine (2000), constructs such an index
by looking at national regulatory authorities and their regulatory practices in 60 countries in
1997. They acknowledge the ability of commercial banks to engage in four diﬀerent activities; (i)
securities underwriting, brokerage and management of mutual funds, (ii) insurance underwriting
and selling, (iii) real estate investment, development and management, and (iv) banks owning
nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. They rate the degree of regulatory restrictiveness for each of these four
activities from 1 to 4 (with larger numbers representing more restrictive regulations) and use
the average as an index of restrictiveness. We use this index as a proxy for regulatory practices
in 32 of our countries.
Barth, Caprio Jr. and Levine (2000) also studies the degree of state ownership of commercial
banks in diﬀerent countries in 1997. State ownership is deﬁned as state-owned bank assets as a
share of total commercial bank assets. We have data on state ownership in 30 of our countries.
An other important structural factor that we include in our study is the quality of govern-
ment. Barth, Caprio Jr. and Levine (2000) deﬁnes good government as the sum of three variables
from LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (1998): (i) risk of expropriation by the
government, (ii) degree of corruption, and (iii) tradition of law and order in the country. Each
variable is based on a scale from 0 to 10 where higher values represent better government. We
have good government indices (estimated using data from 1982 to 1995) for 29 of our countries.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) calculates measures of banking sector eﬃciency.I nt h i s
paper we use an average of two such measures as an index of banking sector eﬃciency; low
overhead costs as a share of total assets of banks is a sign of more eﬃcient banks, and small
bank net interest margins over total assets indicates greater competition between banks. The
smaller the index the more eﬃcient the sector, and it is calculated using data from the 1990s
and for 32 of our countries.
The ﬁnal structural factor we have chosen to include in our study is whether a country has
an explicit deposit insurance scheme at place or not. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999)
investigates the level of deposit protection in 61 countries and construct a zero-one dummy for
the presence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme. The dummy reﬂects the situation in 1997
and is available for 28 of our countries.
In addition to the structural parameters above we have also constructed two dummies cap-
12turing whether a country experienced a banking crisis during one or more of the years 1996, 1997
and 1998 or whether it was one of the Asian crisis core countries in 1997-98. These dummies
are used to assess the ability of our market-based default probability model to capture obvious
credit deteriorations in a country’s banks.
4 Empirical Results
In this section we apply the default probability model described above to banking sectors around
the world and compare the probabilities assessed by the market cross-sectionally and over time.
The relationship between the market’s view on health and stability of banking sectors and
diﬀerent institutional and structural characteristics across countries are further studied.
All estimations and results regarding default probabilities are based on the daily data de-
scribed in section 3 and the model described in section 2. The data shows quite typical charac-
teristics for stock return series like heteroscedasticity and excess kurtosis. We ﬁt the bivariate
GARCH-M model in (13) to each of the 34 countries’ banking sectors but in order to save space
we only present parameter estimates for the world banking index modelled together with the
world market index in Table 2. All GARCH parameters are positive but in the case of the devel-
oped world we cannot reject the possibility of IGARCH. The unconditional correlation between
the world banking sector index and the world market index is very high, 0.85, for the developed
world and much lower, 0.40, for the emerging world. The residuals are all fairly well behaved.
In Fig.s 1 to 4 we plot probabilities of default (the probability of a systemic domestic banking
crisis hitting the country within one year) on a monthly basis for each of the countries from
January 1994 (1996) to June 20028. The two uppermost panels in Fig. 1 present ”probabilities
of default” for the developed world and the emerging world, respectively. Obviously, the market
considers the probability of a world-wide collapse of the ﬁnancial system to be very small. During
the second half of 1998, at the height of the Asian crisis, the probability of default reached its
peak at 0.3% in the developed world and at around 0.5%, in the emerging world. The probability
of a collective bank failure is not only larger in the emerging world but is also kept at an elevated
level for a longer period after the Asian crisis. However, while the market’s assessment of the risk
of a systemic bank failure in the emerging world steadily has decreased over the last two three
years the risk in the developed world has in fact risen slightly. This is most probably caused by
the IT/Telecom debacle that mostly aﬀects banks in the developed world.
8The y-axis has a logarithmic scale and when looking at the graphs one should keep in mind that what seems
like large ﬂuctuations at low probabilities in the ﬁgures not are very large when compared to ﬂuctuations at
higher probabilities (i.e. a change in probability from 0.0000000001 to 0.000001, although a 10000-fold change in
probability, would not be possibe to detect in a linear plot).
13Continuing to the individual countries in Fig.s 1 to 4, we ﬁnd a plethora of diﬀerent patterns.
The only feature common to more or less all the countries is the signiﬁcant rise in default risk at
the start of the Asian crisis 1997. Default probabilities in most countries remain high all through
1997, reach a peak at 1998, and slowly decrease during 1999. One of the more interesting patterns
is that of Argentina’s. With an economy in serious recession and with banks on the brink of
ruin, its banking sector failure probability systematically has risen to the staggering average
level of 10% in 2002. This is about ﬁve times the probability of the second-most fragile banking
sector (i.e. Korea’s). It is also about three times larger than Argentina’s default probability in
1998 and at the same level as the most fragile banking sector in 1998 (i.e. Thailand’s).
In Fig.s 5 and 6 we rank the banking sectors year by year according to their assumed
probability of failure and it is obvious that probabilities overall increased after 1996. The
probabilities peaked in 1998 and since then the levels have come down signiﬁcantly. Not to the
rather low levels of the pre-crisis years, however (notice the change of scale of the abscissa). It
is also evident that the Asian crisis core countries, Malaysia, Korea and Thailand, all became
much more risky (according to the market) 1997 and 1998 compared to before the crisis, both on
absolute and on relative terms. In 1998 the three core countries occupied the worst three slots in
Figure 5, and at least Korea and Thailand have remained risky relative to other countries even
after the crisis. The other countries that suﬀered from banking crises during any of the three
years 1996, 1997 or 1998 (Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Japan and Mexico) were also
considered much riskier than the average country in those years (but less so in other years)9.
In the other end of the spectrum Australia positions itself as the country with the most stable
banking sector according to the stock market. The reason for this believed stability might be
the economy’s (and banking sector’s) relative isolation from world market events. It is also in
line with the conception of Australia as being a safe haven in times of crisis.
There are many reasons why relative as well as absolute levels of banking sectors failure
probability are interesting. However, it would also be interesting to know what structural and
institutional factors the market focuses on when assessing the risk of the banking sector. By
looking at correlations between the structural factors described in section 3 and the market’s
default probabilities we get an indication of possible such factors. However, it is of course
important to remember the limitations of such a correlation study when it comes to determine
whether these factors are the factors the market actually looks at. The structural factors might
9According to Barth, Caprio Jr. and Levine (2000), using data up until 1998, Argentina suﬀered from a
systemic banking crisis from 1995 onwards, Brazil suﬀered from a systemic banking crisis from 1994 onwards,
Hong Kong suﬀered from a non-systemic banking crisis in 1998, India suﬀered from a non-systemic banking crisis
from 1993 onwards, Japan suﬀered from a systemic banking crisis all through the 1990s and Mexico suﬀered from
a systemic banking crisis from 1995 onwards.
14simply be correlated with other more fundamental factors.
Before we present these correlations we turn to Fig. 7 and how the diﬀerent structural
parameters are distributed across countries10. The most market-based countries are Malaysia
followed by Hong Kong, Switzerland and the US. The least market-based is Austria. The most
restrictive banking regulations are at place in Japan and Mexico, while Israel and the UK
top the list of the least regulated banking sectors. In India the state owns a very large share
(80%) of the banking sector, while in about half of the countries the banks are fully privately
owned. European banking sectors tend to top the list of good government, while less developed
countries like Pakistan and Peru occupy the other end of the list. The banking sectors in the
Latin American countries are the least eﬃcient, while the ones in the Netherlands, Singapore
and Japan are the most eﬃcient. Finally, up until 1997, explicit deposit insurance schemes have
been put in place in about two thirds of the countries in our study.
In Table 3 we present correlations between the structural factors and the probabilities
in 1996, 1997 and 199811. The reason why we limit ourselves to these three years is that the
structural factors change over time and that most of the estimates we have are from 199712.
Before the onset of the crisis both the amount of regulative restrictions and the degree of
state ownership was positively correlated to banking sector fragility. Good government not
surprisingly was negatively correlated with bank fragility.
During the crisis years, on the other hand, the perception of good government and the exis-
tence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme are the only structural factors that are signiﬁcantly
(negatively) correlated with the market’s perception of how likely a systemic crisis is to occur.
The (zero-one) dummies for countries experiencing a banking crisis or belonging to one of the
Asian crisis countries are both highly correlated to default probabilities in 1997-98 but not in
1996. This conﬁrms the results in Fig.s 1 to 4 and is in accordance with our expectations of the
market considering crisis countries more prone to have a failing banking sector.
In addition to calculating simple correlations we also run OLS regressions of the default prob-
abilities on the structural parameters. We regress the probabilities on the structural parameters
both one at the time (including the banking crisis dummy and the Asian crisis dummy in each
regression) and jointly in a multiple regression13. For the univariate regressions the results are
10There are rather few outliers. However, the banking sector in India stands out as the clearly most state-owned
sector, and Malaysia’s banking sector stands out as the most market-based one.
11We have structural parameters for a maximum of 32 of our 34 countries. Poland and Taiwan are not included
in the correlation study.
12We believe that the factors change very little over the three years 1996, 1997 and 1998.
13All regressions have been rerun with GDP as a control variable. GDP has not been found to be signiﬁcantly
15presented in columns 1-6 in Table 4-6 and are fairly similar to those from the correlation study.
Before the outbreak of the Asian crisis, most of the structural factors have signiﬁcant regression
parameters; more regulation and more state-owned banks are related to higher probabilities of
default while good government is negatively related to banking sector weaknesses. The only new
ﬁnding compared to the correlation study is that more market-based economies are expected, by
the market, to have less fragile banking sectors. During the initial year of the crisis, 1997, there
are some signs of the ﬁnancial structure and the degree of state ownership being related to the
perceived probability of default. Only good government and deposit insurance are signiﬁcant
both in 1997 and 1998, however. The crisis dummies overall behave as we expect them to; they
are highly signiﬁcant during the crisis years and barely signiﬁcant prior to the crisis. During
the crisis years the degree of explanation (R2) in the univariate regressions is very high and we
c a n n o tr e j e c tt h eh y p o t h e s i st h a ta tl e a s to n eo ft h er e g r e s s o r si sd i ﬀerent from zero (the F-test).
This is not surprising considering the crisis dummies included in the univariate regressions. In
the pre-crisis year 1996, however, only the degree of state ownership, the quality of government
and the deposit insurance regressions have high R2sa n ds i g n i ﬁcant F-statistics.
In the univariate regressions above we have between 28 and 32 countries in each regression.
The degrees of freedom are therefore between 24 and 28. If we regress all structural parameters
jointly together with the two crisis dummies we end up with only 15 degrees of freedom14.
I nt h em u l t i v a r i a t er e g r e s s i o n sw eh a v et h e refore chosen to exclude the crisis dummies15.T o
further reduce the number of regressors and to improve the quality of the regressions we have
also chosen to reduce the number of explanatory variables. We base our choice of remaining
regressors on three criteria; multicollinearity, signiﬁcance of the individual regressors in the
univariate regressions, and the R2 and F-tests in the univariate regressions. The fact that good
government and banking sector eﬃciency are the only factors that are signiﬁcantly correlated
(pair-wise correlations equal to −0.49) together with the non-signiﬁcant univariate regressions
on the banking sector eﬃciency (non-signiﬁcant slope parameters, lowest R2s, non-signiﬁcant F-
values) makes us choosing to remove banking sector eﬃciency from the regression. The resulting
degrees of freedom is 18 and the multiple regression results are presented in column 7 in Table
4-6.
The results are very much in line with the univariate results and again the only structural
parameter that is signiﬁcant in all three years is the quality of government. The existence of
related to the default probability, however, and therefore it is left out of the regressions presented in the paper.
14The whole set of structural factors is available only in 24 countries. The number of parameters to estimate
in the multiple regression is 9.
15We have already seen that the (exogenously deﬁned) crises are captured very well by the dummies.
16an explicit deposit insurance is again signiﬁcantly negatively related to the probability of a
banking failure during 1997 and 1998 but not in 1996. There is also some weak evidence of state
ownership and restrictive regulation as being positively related to banking sector weaknesses.
Finally, all regressions produce high R2 values and in none of the regressions can we reject the
hypothesis of at least one non-zero parameter.
One reason why banking sector eﬃciency does not seem to be related to banking sector
fragility is that the index of banking sector eﬃciency is calculated using data from a ten-year
period (the 1990s), not the single year of 1997. This could also be the reason for the relatively
weak correlation between the ﬁnancial structure and default probabilities. In addition, the eﬀect
of banking sector eﬃciency on default rates is expected to be rather ambiguous; as we deﬁne
banking sector eﬃciency an eﬃcient banking sector could be a signal of healthy banks producing
services at low cost, but it could also signal tight competition in the banking sector with banks
running tight margins and showing low proﬁtability.
Good government is the only structural factor that is signiﬁcantly related to default prob-
abilities in all three years 1996, 1997 and 1998. Not surprisingly, corruption, lack of law and
order and expropriation risk creates a lot of uncertainty regarding the future of banks (as well as
other ﬁrms) both in tranquil and in volatile periods. The fact that the quality of government is
estimated over a 15-year period preceding the period 1996 to 1998 should not necessarily be seen
as a problem since the common perception of the quality of a particular country’s government
equally much is based on history and tradition as it is a product of the latest legal and political
changes.
The degree of state ownership, in turn, is found to be signiﬁcantly positively related to bank-
ing sector fragility before the crisis. During the crisis years this relationship partly disappears
and a reason for this might be that the market learns that state owned banks receive support
and subsidies making a collapse less likely.
An explicit deposit insurance scheme, on the other hand, does not aﬀect the market’s per-
ception of banking sector stability in tranquil times while during the crisis years 1997 and 1998
the market seems to acknowledge the existence of such a scheme; even if equity holders are not
captured by the depositors’ guarantee they might value the guarantee’s role in making bank
runs, and resulting bank defaults, less likely.
Finally, regulations that limit the range of activities a bank is allowed to engage in are
making the banking sector more fragile according to the market (at least before the crisis).
These results are similar to those found by Barth, Caprio Jr., and Levine (2000) but relies on
ad i ﬀerent deﬁnition of banking distress. Greater diversiﬁcation is probably considered to lower
the risk of less restricted banks. Such banks, however, might also engage in riskier projects and
particularly in times of crisis this might be considered a weakness. At the height of the Asian
17crisis there is no clear relationship between the level of regulation and the market’s estimates of
banking sector defaults.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In dealing with today’s increasingly international banks it is important for regulators and su-
pervisors to include the health of foreign banks and banking sectors when assessing their own
domestic banking sector. It is not obvious how the health of (foreign) banks is to be revealed and
in this paper we therefore suggest a simple approach based on stock market behavior. Using an
aggregated version of a model by Hall and Miles (1990) that gives us estimates of time varying
failure rates of banking sectors based only on quoted stock market index levels and their volatil-
ities, we have studied the health of banking sectors world wide over the period 1994 to 2002.
This period includes the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997-98 and we ﬁnd the market’s assessment
of the probability of default to be signiﬁcantly higher during the crisis than before it in almost
all countries. After the crisis the probabilities have come down signiﬁcantly but the fragility
of banking sectors has nonetheless remained relatively high both in developed and in emerging
countries. Some countries stand out as more prone to a systemic crisis than others; during the
Asian crisis the most fragile banking sectors not surprisingly were found in the Asian crisis core
countries Malaysia, Korea and Thailand, and from 2001 onwards the most troubled banking
sector is Argentina’s.
The relationship between institutional factors and the market’s opinion on banking sectors’
health is also studied. We ﬁnd the quality of a country’s government to be strongly negatively
related to the market’s assessment of the probability of failure of the banking sector. The exis-
tence of an explicit deposit insurance is also signiﬁcantly negatively related to the probability of
a systemic bank collapse, but only during the Asian crisis. As expected, we also ﬁnd the proba-
bility of default to be systematically higher in countries suﬀering from some kind of (exogenously
deﬁned) banking crisis (at the time of the crisis).
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Table 2: GARCH-M parameter estimates and standardized residual statistics for the bank index
modelled together with the market index (emerging countries and developed countries resp.).
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Market Index Bank Index Market Index Bank Index
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Mean -0.0419 -0.0398 -0.0683 -0.0674
Standard Deviation 1.002 1.001 0.998 0.998
Skewness −0.367 −0.097 -0.385 0.028
Excess Kurtosis 1.321 1.622 1.438 2.056
Small ﬁgures are standard deviations.
21Table 3: Correlation between banking sector failure probabilities and structural factors in the
32 countries 1996, 1997, and 1998.

















































Small ﬁgures are p-values and signiﬁcance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels are denoted by *,
**, and *** respectively.

































banking sector eﬃciency −0,198
0,473












































no. of countries in regression 32 32 30 29 32 28 24
Small ﬁgures are p-values and signiﬁcance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels are denoted by *,
**, and *** respectively. R
2 is the degree of explanation and F(n, d.f) tests if at least one of the regression
parameters of the independent variables is non-zero. n is the number of independent variables and d.f. is the
degree of freedom.

































banking sector eﬃciency −0,227
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2 0,582 0,558 0,609 0,585 0,556 0,613 0,422














no. of countries in regression 32 32 30 29 32 28 24
Small ﬁgures are p-values and signiﬁcance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels are denoted by *,
**, and *** respectively. R
2 is the degree of explanation and F(n, d.f) tests if at least one of the regression
parameters of the independent variables is non-zero. n is the number of independent variables and d.f. is the
degree of freedom.

































banking sector eﬃciency 5,586
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2 0,752 0,752 0,784 0,816 0,750 0,826 0,464














no. of countries in regression 32 32 30 29 32 28 24
Small ﬁgures are p-values and signiﬁcance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels are denoted by *,
**, and *** respectively. R
2 is the degree of explanation and F(n, d.f) tests if at least one of the regression
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Figure 4: Probability of default within one year (%). 1996, 1997 and so on means January 1996,
January 1997 etc.
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Figure 6: Ranking of probability of default (annual average) within one year (%).
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Figure 7: Cross-country distribution of structural parameters.
32